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Estafa and the
Bouncing Checks, Law and Jurisprudence
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OTHER INTERESTING ARTICLES |
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We agree with
the trial court that the probative value of the said
letters is nil. The trial court correctly ruled:
“The court doubts the probative value of the
contents of [the letter] because the person who
testified thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar Singson,
was not the one who prepared the document. He was
only one [of] those who was furnished a copy
thereof. Moreover, when said piece of evidence was
presented, there were inconsistencies in the
testimony of the petitioner as to how he was able to
procure said documents. In a hearing he testified
that he personally procured said letter from the
records of PHIVIDEC and the person who certified
said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross
examination, he testified that he did not personally
obtain said letter and he was not there when the
person who authenticated said letter signed it and
that it was only given to him by his former counsel,
This is further muddled when Atty. Singson testified
that he was the one who authenticated said document
on December 7, 1987 from his copy upon the request
of the accused. Atty. Singson has already severed
his ties with P1-Il VIDEC on the latter part of the
year 1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no
longer connected with PHI VIDEC when he
authenticated said document based on his copy which
implies that the document was not obtained from the
records of PHI VIDEC.”
Further, even assuming that the letter may be given
credence, we are unable to see any indication that
the amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion
thereof (assuming that the said amount represents
the advance payment made by Skiva) has been received
by Aurora and/or Uni-Group from petitioner. At most,
what said letter indicates is that Aurora
acknowledges liability to Uni-Group in the said
amount or that said amount has been received by
UniGroup from Skiva as advance payment which
Uni-Group may have, in turn, assigned to Aurora. The
glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be seen
from the said letter that there was actual receipt
by Aurora from petitioner of the amount indicated
therein, or at least a portion thereof, after
deduction of the cost of the materials purchased to
manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that
upon withdrawal of the said amounts, petitioner
caused the telegraphic transfer of the amount to
another account prior to petitioner’s receipt of the
amount in pesos.5 In fact, upon being confronted by
the prosecution with Exhibits “R” and “T” which are
account debit forms showing that certain amounts
were deducted by Citibank N.A. from the joint
account as telegraphic transfer fee for the amounts
withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that
upon withdrawal, “the dollars was converted by the
bank, remitted abroad, and given to me in pesos.”
The act committed by petitioner of remitting the
funds abroad constitutes an act of conversion or
misappropriation. This Court has previously held
that even a temporary disturbance of property rights
constitutes misappropriation. The words “convert”
and “misappropriate” as used in Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, connote
an act of using or disposing of another’s property
as if it were one’s own, or of devoting to purpose
or use different from that agreed upon. To
“misappropriate” a thing of value for one’s own use
includes, not only conversion to one’s personal
advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. Thus, when
petitioner caused the remittance of the amount
withdrawn to another account, such act constituted
conversion or misappropriation or unauthorized
disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose
for which the property was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of
estafa is not present as the party prejudiced, in
accordance with the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, is Skiva, when petitioner had
no obligation o account to Skiva the proceeds of the
amount withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent
with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is
the owner of the sum remitted as advance payment,
petitioner had the obligation to account for the
proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva.6 Thus,
petitioner maintains that a conviction for estafa
will not hold as no damage to Aurora was alleged in
the information nor did the prosecution present any
proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings
Corporation ii. Co.7 in estafa, the person
prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need
not be the owner of the goods misappropriated. Thus,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
“any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned [in Article 315]” may be held liable for
estafa. The use by the law of the word “another”
instead of the word “owner” means that as an element
of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone
other than the perpetrator of the crime.8 Thus, the
finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party
prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum
misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of
the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is
absent as no demand was made by Skiva on petitioner.
Petitioner argues that although demand was made by
Skiva to Aurora/Uni-Group and! or Mr. Lettmayr, no
demand was shown to have been made on petitioner
himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied
when demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group. To
require Skiva to make a demand on petitioner himself
would be superfluous and would serve no other
additional purpose. We note that at the time when
Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of the
jeans, except for the advice of Mr. Lettmayr to
direct her queries to petitioner who was in charge
of procuring the materials for the jeans, Ms. Tujan
could not have known that petitioner may be
primarily responsible for the non-delivery of the
jeans. As far as Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was
the obligation of the Aurora Uni-Group to deliver
the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not
complied with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted
appropriately when it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group
the return of the amount advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by
Skiva! Olivier upon petitioner himself to uphold the
conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind
application of the law. In the case of United States
v. Ramirez° this Court held:
“The consummation of the crime of estafa ... does
not depend on the fact that a request for the return
of the money is first made and refused in order that
the author of the crime should comply with the
obligation to return the sum misapplied. The
appropriation or conversion of money received to the
prejudice of the owner thereof are the sole
essential facts which constitute the crime of
estafa, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the
penalty imposed by the Penal Code.’°
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals”
this Court ruled that the law does not require a
demand as a condition precedent to the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds and property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation .“
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,’2
we also held that in a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary when there evidence of
misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no
authority to institute the present action as estafa
was not committed against Skiva but against
Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that
the transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group
was one of sale petitioner argues that pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,’3 the complaint should not have been
instituted by Skiva as it is not the “offended
party” contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had
no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of
the amount withdrawn from the joint account.’4
The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates
one that is flied in court to commence a criminal
action in those cases where a complaint of the
offended party is required by law, instead of an
information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It
is not necessary that the proper “offended party”
file a complaint for the purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless
the offense subject of the complaint is one that
cannot be prosecuted oficio, any competent person
may file a complaint for preliminary
investigation.’5
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is
commenced by a complaint or information, both of
which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed
directly in court, the same must be filed by the
offended party and in case of an information, the
same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a
“complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in
the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by
Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that
petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
appealed judgment of the court a quo finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
How estafa is committed and
rationale for its commission.
Estafa is a crime committed by a person who defrauds
another causing him to suffer damages, by means of
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or false
pretense or fraudulent acts.16 Greed has always been
man’s failings — the hope of greater gain has lured
many a man to throw caution, and his common sense,
to the wind. 17
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